There have been profound changes in both political and economic institutions in China over the last twenty years. Moreover, the pace of transition has led to variation across the country in the level of development.
Introduction
The late twentieth century witnessed the transformation of numerous centrally planned economies around the world to market systems. Many of these transitions were characterized by a "Big Bang" (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004 ) that combined economic liberalization with massive forces of democratization and rapid privatization. China has followed a quite different path where economic reform and transition to a market economy occurred without democratization, liberalization proceeded only incrementally and privatization was delayed until almost two decades after the initiation of reforms. The development of China has followed an incremental and experimental approach to reform that has resulted in high and stable growth rates for over three decades (Prasad and Rajan, 2006) . This remarkable growth performance was accompanied by a relatively undeveloped legal and financial system, which makes China a puzzle. Williamson (1996;  pp. 377-379) argues that creating effective institutions and the rules that govern economic transactions lies at the heart of a successful transition. Thus, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) conclude that China seems like "a counterexample to the findings in law, institutions, finance and economic growth literatures." Our aim is to better understand this puzzle by looking at differences in institutional development and growth performance among the provinces of China.
Economists have long been interested in the role of institutions and financial markets in explaining economic transitions and growth (Henisz 2000) . In a review paper, Aron (2000) describes the institutional framework as comprised of both formal and informal constraints and argues that institutions affects growth because they influence the costs of transactions and the efficiency of production. In other words, the structure of both formal and informal rules and the character of their enforcement are what define the incentives and wealth-maximizing opportunities of individuals and organizations. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) are typical of the empirical literature; they show that differences in local financial development explain the spread of entrepreneurship and economic growth. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) study the relationship between law and finance, and consequently economic development, and highlight the importance of legal institutions.
Most studies of institutional and political influences on growth use cross country data which is difficult to interpret because of the diversity in historical experiences, cultural norms and institutional contexts. For our study of China we use sub-national data controls for such national characteristics and can focus on specific aspects of the institutional and political system. We intend to see whether the economic performance of China can be ascribed, at least partially, to the evolution of the country's legal, economic and political institutions and its financial markets. We use a panel of data from the Chinese provinces to study the relationship between measures of the development of legal and political institutions and indicators of financial market development, and economic growth. We exploit the regional differences in the timing and extent of these developments to demonstrate the impact on economic growth. Based on a sample of 31
Chinese provinces for the period 1986-2003, our empirical results indicate that those regions with greater rule of law, more property rights awareness and more political pluralism also have stronger growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a description of relevant institutional reforms in China over the last two decades. Section II examines the relationship between economic and political reform and economic growth and reviews the relevant literature. Section III describes our data and the various measures we employ for institutional development. In Section IV, we present our results and examine the relationship between institutional development and growth in China. Concluding remarks are found in Section V.
I Institutional reform in contemporary China
The transition from planned to market economy necessitates the establishment of an almost entirely new set of institutions. However, the desire of the Chinese Communist Party to retain a monopoly on political power inhibits the development of legal institutions and the evolution of local governmental authorities. Nevertheless, there have been dramatic ideological shifts in China already that have resulted in the gradual development of legal institutions, the decentralization of political institutions, rapid growth of the private sector and the development of financial markets. We briefly describe the institutional developments in China that are likely to have effected economic growth:
Banking reform. Credit markets in China are relatively large by international standards; the ratio of assets of deposit money banks to GDP is larger than it is in many developed countries. However, credit to the private sector is a much smaller share of GDP than in most other countries. Reform of the financial system began only in the early 1990s when the central government decided to separate the policy banks from commercial banks. Subsequent developments included the transformation of urban credit cooperatives into commercial banks (1996) (1997) (1998) , granting limited licenses to some foreign banks and granting licenses to non-state commercial banks and introducing standard accounting and prudential norms. Despite the reforms, serious problems in the banking sector persisted such as non-performing loans (NPLs) and extensive corruption (Chen and Feng 2000) . However, many additional changes were introduced after China's entry into the WTO in 2001. These include further liberalization of interest rates, fewer restrictions on ownership and increased operational freedom. The most recent developments include partial privatization of the banks with shares sold in the market and minority foreign ownership stakes, see Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2007) .
Capital markets. The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991 was initially aimed at promoting the reform of state owned enterprises (SOEs). Soon thereafter, tens of thousands of SOEs sought permission to restructure into shareholding companies. In the early 1990s, local leaders retained significant influence over the listing process and the enforcement of secondary market regulation, but in the late 1990s, the central regulatory authority was able to consolidate its influence. The stock market regained the confidence of public investors and has enjoyed rapid expansion since then.
Corporate bonds markets lagged behind the development of the equity market.
Although bonds were first issued in 1986, outstanding corporate bond issues in 1999
were only about one-half of one percent of GDP (People's Daily, Sept. 1, 2000) . The corporate bond market began to expand after 2000 when new rules governing issuance were implemented. Local firms, besides the giant SOEs, are also encouraged to issue corporate bonds and market forces increasingly determine the spread on bonds.
Growth of the private sector. An important outcome of the market-oriented reforms in China is the emergence of a significant private sector, which now accounts for about a third of GDP (IFC, 2000) . The development of the private sector was part of the unique Chinese "dual-track" approach to reform. Private enterprises first took hold in rural areas and in the 1980s larger private enterprises began to emerge although they were not officially recognized until 1988. In the 1990s, government policies began to encourage the transformation of SOEs and collectives into private enterprises. Private enterprises developed rapidly and a constitutional amendment in 1999 formally recognized this shift, thereby allowing the private sector to emerge from the shadows.
The growth of the private sector has mitigated the social costs of SOE reforms and led to China's impressive share in world exports. Despite the contributions of the private sector to the economy, it is poorly served by the formal financial markets, as only a very small portion of bank credit goes to private firms and only a small share of listed firms are fully private. As a result, private firms rely heavily on informal financial channels and self-financing.
Evolving legal environment. The development of the modern Chinese legal system starts after the Cultural Revolution when members of the legal profession were rehabilitated and a new state constitution that emphasized the rule of law was enacted.
In the 1990s, legal reform became a government priority and legislation designed to modernize and professionalize the nation' s lawyers, judges, and prisons was enacted. gives citizens the right to sue the state (Burns, 1999) .
As part of its economic and legal reforms, China adopted a law to protect foreign patents in 1984. In the late 1980s, regulations regarding shareholding enabled enterprises to define property rights and separate collective and private enterprise shares.
The 1994 Company Law improved property rights by establishing the firm as a legal entity that owns assets. Further steps to assuring rights to private property have been taken in recent years. One notable feature of the evolution of the legal environment is that the laws regarding property rights were locally enacted, following national legislation, and thus the implementation differed across regions (Krug and Hendrischke 2003) .
Changes in the political environment. China' s leaders have long recognized the need for political reform and, most importantly, the system of people's congresses that introduced basic electoral processes and political institutions predate the Cultural Revolution (Townsend, 1969, pp.103-44 This brief summary of the major changes in economic and political institutions in China shows two things. First, the reform process has already touched on a broad range of economic, political and social institutions. Second, reforms are often locally based and thus there is variation across the country and over time in institutional development.
In this paper, we try to exploit these differences over time and place to better understand the determinants of growth.
II Institutional reform and economic growth: hypotheses and literature
Our review of institutional reform in contemporary China emphasized three elements -the legal, financial and political institutions. We focus here on the links between institutional reforms in these spheres and economic growth.
Generally, the link between institutional development and economic growth has gained increasing interest among researchers in recent decades (see the survey by Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005) . To begin, well-defined property rights are a cornerstone for private sector development and growth. Furthermore, the protection of property rights facilitates the development of financial markets. Finally, well-functioning and flexible financial markets allow entrepreneurs to embrace economic opportunities and promote growth. Aron (2000) argues that institutions are often weak in developing countries because the rules that ensure the use and trading of property rights are absent or poorly enforced. An empirical study of transition countries by Jonhson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) examines the relative importance of property rights and external finance and finds property rights to be overwhelmingly important. Our hypothesis is that the strength of property rights and the legal institutions that support them create a favorable growth environment. Claessens and Laeven (2003) , using data for both developed and developing countries find that better property rights lead to higher growth through improved operation of the financial sector. They also find that the growth effect is quantitatively as large as that of improved access to financing due to greater financial development.
There are only a few empirical studies of the role of institutional development in China. For example, Cull and Xu (2005) use firm-level data and show that expropriation risk, contract enforcement, access to finance, and ownership structure all appear to matter for Chinese firms' reinvestment decisions. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), also based on the firm-level data in China, compare growth in the formal sector (state-owned and publicly traded firms) and the informal sector and find that the informal sector is the source of most economic growth although it is associated with much poorer applicable legal and financial mechanisms. They argue that there exist effective informal financing channels and governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, to support this growth. Finally, using data on Chinese entrepreneurs, Djankov, Qian, Roland and Zhuravskaya (2006) highlighted the importance of legal and economic institutions in fostering entrepreneurship.
Political institutions, another component of the institutional framework, also exert an important influence on economic growth. In a transition economy, an improving democracy may have significant effect on political and economic conditions (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2006; Borner, Brunetti and Weder, 1995) . Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin (2004) argue that democracy brings political checks and balances, responsiveness to citizen priorities, openness, and self-correcting mechanisms --all of which contribute to growth. On the other hand, corruption, which is a signal of the poor quality of political institutions, imposes substantial economic costs, particularly in less developed economies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, Mauro, 1995 ).
An aspect of institutional development that is beginning to attract more attention is the link between political pluralism and economic development. Pluralism is a guiding principle that permits the peaceful coexistence of different interests, convictions and lifestyles. Unlike a totalitarian regime, a pluralist society acknowledges the diversity of There is a well known literature that links financial sector development and growth (see Levine 1997) . The underlying hypothesis is that financial intermediaries, particularly banks, are able to identify credit-worthy projects, mobilizing savings, pool risks and reduce transactions costs. Thus, a deeper financial sector accelerates economic growth. However, the role of banks in transition countries is complicated by the legacy of the planned economy era. Gorton and Winton (1998) find that established banks in transition economies tend to suffer from an overhang of bad loans and implicit subsidies that often favor continued lending to inefficient state-owned enterprises which inhibits growth. Thus the banking sector might or might not contribute to growth during the transition process.
Although our hypothesis is that financial sector depth is related to growth, we would not be surprised to find the hypothesis rejected by the data in China because of the slow pace of banking sector reform. The Chinese banking sector continues to suffer from bad loan problems even as growth has taken place (Bonin and Huang, 2001 ).
An additional channel of financial sector influence is through the capital markets which also rely on institutions such as corporate governance and regulatory structures.
Stock markets accelerate growth by facilitating the ability to trade ownership and by allowing owners to easily diversify portfolios. Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) show that stock market liquidity and banking development are positively associated with growth in a panel study while Rousseau and Xiao (2007) analyze the time series evidence for China.
We will also examine the hypothesis that differences in capital market development among the Chinese provinces are related to growth
There are a few prior studies with province-level data that examine financial sector development and the reduced role of state ownership in China. Biggeri (2003) uses provincial level data for the period 1986 to 2001 and finds that the level of aggregate output in each province is negatively influenced by the presence of state owned enterprises. Chen and Feng (2000) find that growth of private and semi-private There are a few recent studies that look at the effects of financial deepening in China with provincial level data. Aziz and Duenwald (2002) and Boyreau-Debray 
III Data and Methodology
Empirical research using cross-country data has provided much insight on the role of institutions in promoting economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000) . However, cross-country studies are sometimes faulted for being unable to distinguish between the proximate determinants of growth and country specific idiosyncrasies. The use of sub-national data has major advantages over cross-country studies in addressing these issues. The coastal provinces experienced more rapid growth than the interior provinces some of which made rapid progress in the 1980s and then fell behind.
A major challenge in this paper was to find data that adequately measure or proxy the institutional developments described above. In some instances direct measures of institutional development can be obtained while in other instances the available data provide only imperfect proxies. We begin with the financial institutions for which direct measures are obtainable and widely used in growth studies. We then proceed to the legal and political institutions for which proxies provide indirect but adequate representations. The data are linked using the ratio of the series in 1994 (the year prior to major financial reforms).
The second financial measure is the ratio of equity and non-financial corporate debt (long-term and short-term) issuance to GDP which is an indicator of non-bank financial market activity. The issuance is for firms incorporated in the respective province. In the sense that the issuance of equity and corporate bonds represents the activities of the capital markets, this ratio also captures the degree of development of financial institutions such as investment banks, accounting firms, supervisory bodies, etc.
Our equity issuance data are collected by summarizing the equity issuance data from both exchanges in China, based on the annual issues of the Statistics Yearbooks of Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the Statistical Yearbooks of Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
Equity issuance is defined as the proceeds received by listed firms raised from issues.
Data on corporate bonds issuance are collected from the ACFB and are available until 1999 and subsequently from the annual issues of the provincial yearbooks. Missing corporate bond issuance data are extrapolated for each province based on the growth in national bond issuance.
The first institutional structure measure that we examine is the size of the private sector. The influence of privatization on growth in transition is not always obvious.
For example, Frydman et al. (1999) compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of Central Europe, and argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control. On the other hand, La Porta and López-De-Silanes (1999) examine privatized firms in Mexico and find that that privatization is followed by large improvements in performance. We Another important dimension of the rule of law that has been shown to effect economic growth is the awareness of and respect for property rights, particularly intellectual property. Gould and Gruben (1996) , utilizing cross-country data on patent protection, trade regime, and country-specific characteristics, provide evidence suggesting that intellectual property protection is a significant determinant of economic growth. Park and Ginarte (1997) , based on a sample of countries for the period 1960-1990, find that intellectual property rights affect economic growth indirectly by stimulating R&D and the accumulation of physical capital.
Our proxy for the awareness of property rights is the ratio of the number of domestic trademark applications to the number of firms. This ratio captures both awareness of property rights and the degree of development of secure property rights-associated institutions in each province. Our hypothesis is that more trade marking reflects confidence in the preservation of property rights and a desire to defend them.
Data on domestic trademark applications were collected from the annual issues of The proportion of non-Communist Party members in the People's Congress at the national level is not just average of the ratios of all provinces in China; instead, it is the proportion of non party member from the National People's Congress. National People's Congress members are elected from the Congress members at the province level. This national measure is an excellent indicator of the overall political environment in the whole country, in the sense that just before each once-in-5-year election year, the members is higher than the national benchmark at that time, then the province arguably has a more relaxed or pluralistic political environment. Although there is no direct or causal link between political pluralism and economic growth, we maintain that an increasingly pluralistic political environment leads to better decision making, more competition and generally favors growth. We are unaware of any studies of the economic effects of pluralism in China.
The proportion of non-party members in the people's congress is an adequate proxy for political pluralism although the Communist Party continues to be the only party in China and does not face competition from other political groups in the country.
Although, China is hardly a pluralist system our variable provides a reasonably good representation of relative political pluralism among the different regions. Consistent with our argument here, Tanner 1983-1987, 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002 .
Finally, we also include three control variables in our growth regressions that are commonly found in growth rate studies starting with Barro's (1991) specification. First, the log of real initial (or lagged) GDP per capita will provide evidence of any convergence effects.
Second, a secondary school enrollment ratio controls for the influence of human capital investments on growth. Barro (1991) Third, the ratio of exports to GDP is a measure of openness of the local economy.
Descriptive statistics and variable names are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the variables. 5 The mean real GDP growth rate is 7.0 percent and the standard deviation is almost as large. All of the explanatory variables exhibit a reasonable amount of variation across time and province. The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean is greater than one for all of the institutional variables except bank loans to GDP and the ratio of private sector investment to the total.
Although the variation is influenced by outliers, 6 the variation does indicate differences in the timing and extent of institutional development across China. No effort was made to exclude such observations other than to include fixed effects for provinces in some regressions. Interestingly, the simple correlations with GDP growth are all modest. The level of GDP is highly correlated with the schooling, openness and the institutional variables.
Our regression specification builds on the approach to growth equations introduced by Barro (1991) . The baseline equation includes the convergence effect (log of initial real GDP), the human capital investment variable (schooling) and the export ratio (openness). We will show that the baseline regression provides a reasonable framework for analyzing growth in China. We then add measures of financial sector development, institutional development and political pluralism to the baseline regression.
We start with OLS regressions that are shown in Table 3 with robust standard errors. It is well known that OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent when there are dynamic effects and simultaneities in the specification. To account for these effects the literature (e.g., Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000 and Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000) employs the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques developed by Arellano and Bond and others for panel estimation and results with this technique are found in Tables 4 and 5. 5 Additional summary tables with the growth rates for each province by year and the mean of all explanatory variables for each province are available from the corresponding author by emai. 6 Beijing is often an outlier. For example bank loans and the presence of legal professionals are much higher there than in nay other province.
The Arellano Bond GMM technique is specifically designed to address the econometric problems induced by unobserved group-specific effects and endogeneity of the explanatory variables in lagged-dependent-variable models, such as growth regressions. Similar to Levine et al. (2000), we employ an augmented GMM procedure outlined in Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed in Blundell and Bond (1998) , which combines the regression in differences with the regression in levels (see Bond 2002 ). In the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator, the instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables, and the instruments for the regression in differences are the lagged levels.
7
These are appropriate instruments under the additional assumption: that there is no correlation between the differences of these variables and the country-specific effects, while correlation between levels of the right-hand side variables and the country-specific effect is allowed. There are two tests for the validity of the instruments. The first is either a Sargan or Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process.
8
The second test is the autoregressive (AR) test, which examines the hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated in both the difference regression and the system difference-level regression. By construction, the differenced error term is allowed to be first-order serially correlated, but the second-order serially correlation of error term will violate the assumption of GMM procedure. Table 4 presents the equations with annual data estimated with the Blundell and
Bond dynamic panel-data estimation technique, i.e., two-step system GMM estimations.
We treat all of the financial and institutional variables as endogenous and the baseline variables as exogenous. As described above, the instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables, and the instruments for the 7 More specifically, we use the two-step GMM instead of one-step because two-step is asymptotically more efficient, meanwhile we also compensate the potentially downward biased two-step standard errors by making a finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005) . 8 As for the over-identifying restrictions, we present the Hansen test, because the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation while the Hansen statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is robust. regression in differences are the lagged levels. In Table 4 we also report Wald Chi-square test statistic, P-value of Hansen test, and P-value of AR(1) and AR (2) tests. In all instances, the P-values of Hansen test and AR(2) test are larger than 0.05, which indicates failure to reject the null hypotheses of over-identification and second-order serial correlation of error terms. In other words, the specification tests support the validity of the instruments. 9 This supports the interpretation of the estimated coefficients as being free from endogeneity bias.
Another approach to the endogeneity problems commonly found in the growth literature is to use growth rates averaged over several years as the dependent variable and to use initial year values for all the independent variables. For example, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use non-overlapping five-year average data in their GMM specifications. Similarly, we report the GMM estimates based on three-year average growth rates in Table 5 .
10
These regressions satisfy the specification tests. There is no evidence of second order serial correlation and the regressions pass the Hansen specification test.
IV Results and Interpretation
Each of the regression tables shows the same model specifications. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses in all the regression tables and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The first equation reports the baseline model -regressions that only include the log of lagged real GDP per capita, the secondary school enrollment ratio and openness. The second equation shows the baseline growth model augmented by the two measures of financial sector development. Similarly, equation three introduces the legal institutions variables.
9 In many instances the p-values for the Hansen tests are close to one which suggests that there are too many instruments in the regressions relative to the number of cross sectional observations (the provinces).
We reestimated the models with fewer instruments by reducing the number of lags included in the GMM estimates and find that the results are not substantially different. The authors thank Thorsten Beck for bringing this to their attention. 10 Our panel consists of data for 31 provinces (including 4 municipalities) over the period 1986-2003, so there are six non-overlapping periods (1986-1988, 1989-1991,1992-1994,1995-1997,1998-2000, 2001-2002) .
Equation four presents the growth model augmented by both the financial and institutional variables. Equations six to nine introduce the political pluralism variable, and show the robustness of the results to some changes in specification.
The broad picture presented by the results is consistent with our expectations.
Although, coefficient estimates and confidence levels vary from equation to equation and across tables, the overall picture is supportive of our hypotheses. The discussion that follows will be based on all three estimation approaches: OLS in Table 3 , annual system GMM in Table 4 , and three-year average system GMM in Table 5 .
To begin the baseline regression provides some evidence of a convergence effect.
In the OLS and annual system GMM estimations, the convergence effect is mostly insignificant, while in the three-year average system GMM it is significant and in line with expectations. 11 The effect of the secondary school enrolment rate variable on growth is consistently positive and significant in all equations. The openness variable is positive and significant in the three-year average system GMM but not with the OLS and annual system GMM estimates. Overall, the baseline variables perform better in the three-year average GMM models in Table 5 than in the OLS regressions in Table 3 and annual system GMM estimates in Table 4 .
Turning to coefficients on the measures of financial sector depth, we find that the coefficients on bank loans to GDP and capital market activity to GDP are often of opposite signs. The capital market depth variable is positive and significant, as hypothesized, but the bank depth variable is usually negative. This latter result is not surprising since, as discussed earlier, there are at least two reasons why bank lending may not have a positive influence on growth for our Chinese sample. First, the largely state owned Chinese banks were saddled with nonperforming loans and continued bad lending practices throughout much of our sample period. Second, the successful bank intermediation relies on a credible government commitment to avoid interference with 11 The actual data does not show any indication of convergence. The standard deviation of growth rates across provinces is fairly constant until the mid 1990s and then increases. The growth take off in coastal provinces widens the distribution. Convergence effects take place very slowly and the time period studied is quite short.
private property rights and their independence from government intervention. In other words bank lending in China, even as the economy was growing rapidly, is not associated with growth because of the ongoing relationships between the banks and state owned firms and the continued influence of the government intervention. Bonin and Wachtel (2003) discuss similar phenomenon in central and Eastern Europe where banks suffered from bad loans inherited from the socialist ' monobank' and from defaults on new loans, and banks had little incentive to avoid giving bad loans partly because they did not face a hard budget constraint.
In the case of our study, the Chinese bank loans for most of our period were predominantly government directed and granted to inefficient state owned or related enterprises rather than the more efficient private sector. Consistent with the hypothesis that the negative coefficient of bank loan on growth is due to the soft-budget problem stemming from non-performing loans extended to SOEs, Biggeri (2003) shows that the output level in each province is negatively influenced by the presence of SOEs. Also, our empirical evidence of the role of bank loans on growth for China is consistent with the studies by Duenwald (2002), and Boyreau-Bebray (2003) , and Hao (2006) .
On the other hand, the capital market depth variable reflects private sector activity and therefore might be more relevant in promoting the real growth in the Chinese context, and the impact of capital market depth on growth implied by our results is fairly large. The OLS regressions (Table 3) and annual system GMM (Table 4) Finally, we introduce our measure of political pluralism, the relative presence of non-party members in the province People's Congress. The coefficients are positive and significant in almost all the estimations of OLS regressions, annual system GMM, and three-year average system GMM (see equation 6, 7, 8, 9) . The coefficients in equation 6 of Table 4 , for example, suggest that a one standard deviation (0.102) increase in relative pluralism is associated with as 0.6 percentage point increases in the growth rate.
In sum, our results show that after controlling for the province-specific effects, endogeneity and potential problems associated with weak instruments, the data suggest a strong, positive link between institutional development and economic growth in China.
Robustness tests. In order to be more confident in our results we preformed various robustness tests that will be summarized here. The robustness tests address two important issues. First, we investigate whether the use of interpolated data affects our results and second, we examine the influence on our results of atypical relationships between the central government and large municipalities or with provinces that are receiving policy preferences. In all instances examined, there are no changes to our conclusion.
As discussed in section III, the data for the full sample period includes several instances where the institutional variables were interpolated or estimated. In order to confirm the robustness of our results we re-estimated the models with interpolated or estimated data points excluded. First, we re-estimate the models with data for 1986-1999 only, which excludes the years for which 'Bond and equity issuance/GDP' data are projected. The results are essentially unchanged.
Second, we examined OLS estimates for 1990, 1995, and 2000-2003 Fourth, data for 'relative pluralism' is missing for six provinces so we re-estimated all the models with these provinces excluded. The results do not change substantively when the provinces for which data was projected are excluded.
The central government tends to exercise much stronger control over four large municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) than over the other provinces.
Thus, we re-estimated the models without these four municipalities, and find that our results are robust as to whether we include the four municipalities in our sample or not.
Finally, certain provinces have been, at times, beneficiaries of preferential policies such as favorable tax treatments, more economic autonomy and special economic zones. In order to take this preferential treatment into account we introduced a dummy variable for those province-year observations. The dummy is highly significant but the results are otherwise little changed.
In sum, our panel results are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses. Estimates with these robustness checks are available upon request from the authors.
V Conclusion
Since China's economic success is virtually unparalleled in recent history, the transition path that the country has followed may be unique as well. Thus it is important to see whether and how the transition in specifically Chinese institutional structures has effected economic growth. In this paper, we review the institutional developments in China since the start of reforms, and empirically examine the role of institutional development on economic growth, using a panel of provincial data. Our evidence indicates the institutional development plays a strong role in promoting economic growth.
We investigate three facets of institutional development: financial sector development, development of legal institutions and the introduction of political pluralism.
The first facet is represented by measures of financial deepening. We find that only capital market depth has a strong influence on growth while the impact of bank lending is not significant and sometimes negative. Proxies for institutional development are harder to identify. A broad measure is simply the size of the private sector in the economy, which we find to have a strong influence on growth. It reflects the degree of protection of property rights, fairness of the judicial system, extent of allowance and tolerance of the local governments to the private sector and the extent of local entrepreneurship. We also identify direct measures of institutional development which are proxies for the Dependent variable is the three-year (non-overlapping) average of real per capita GDP growth, and all independent variables are the initial year of the three year period. Based on our panel sample of 1986-2003, there are six time 3-year time periods (the last is for just two years). Definitions of variables are same as in Table 1 . N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. Specification statistics including Wald Chi 2 , P-value of Hansen over-identification test, AR(1) and AR(2) test of the error terms are also reported. Absolute values of t-statistics of the coefficients of the independent variables are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
